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Abstract—This paper reviews the requirements for the security
mechanisms that are currently being developed in the framework
of the European research project INDECT. An overview of
features for integrated technologies such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), Cryptographic Algorithms, Quantum Cryp-
tography, Federated ID Management and Secure Mobile Ad-hoc
networking are described together with their expected use in
INDECT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The INDECT project [1] “Intelligent information system
supporting observation, searching and detection for security
of citizens in urban environment” is a Collaborative Research
Project funded by the EU 7th Framework Programme. Its main
aim is to develop cost-effective tools for helping European
Police Services to enforce the law and guarantee the pro-
tection of European citizens. These tools must comply with
both country-level laws as well as European-level directives
including, among many others, the European Declaration on
Human Rights [2].
Obviously, Police information systems have stringent secu-
rity requirements. In fact during the requisites gathering phase,
security was deemed as the most important feature by end
users, ahead of other common requisites such as performance
or ease of use. Therefore, in order to guarantee the security,
confidentiality and privacy of all the subsystems, users and
data involved, the INDECT project has a specific task whose
main objective is to supervise the security and privacy of the
project [3]. Moreover, this task also carries out research on
novel security mechanisms to further enhance the security of
INDECT systems and other Police Information Systems. This
paper is focused on the latter objective.
Although we consider that employing standard and well-
studied security technologies is one of the best practices to
address security, it is possible to enhance common security
tools like VPNs or Key Management Centers with new com-
ponents, such as a) Cryptographic Algorithms, b) Quantum
Cryptography, c) Federated ID management, d) Secure ad-hoc
routing protocols.
The objective of this paper is to introduce the key security
components to be used in INDECT and to present the require-
ments of these components in a comprehensive manner.
II. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS (VPN)
Given the distributed nature of INDECT, with agents inter-
connected over public networks (Internet, wireless networks,
etc), the use of VPNs will be required in many cases.
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) enables secure and private
data transmission over an unsecured and shared network
infrastructure. VPNs secure the transmitted data by encapsu-
lating the data and then encrypting the data. Encapsulating is
often referred to as tunneling because data are transmitted from
one network to another, transparently across a public network
infrastructure.
A good VPN solution should address most of the following
issues:
• Protecting data from eavesdropping by using encryption
technologies.
• Protecting packets from tampering by using packet in-
tegrity hashing functions.
• Protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks by using
authentication mechanisms.
• Protecting against replay attacks by using sequence num-
bers when transmitting protected data.
• Defining the data encapsulation and protection mecha-
nisms, and how protected traffic is transmitted between
devices.
• Defining what traffic is necessary to protect.
Not every VPN implementation should include all of these
components or does not implement them as securely as other
VPNs. Therefore, it is very important to define a security
policy in order to determine what VPN technology is the most
suitable one for a particular situation. It is often possible to
use multiple VPN solutions in the same network. Nowadays,
the most important types of VPN technologies are IPSec, SSL
VPN, GRE, MPLS VPN, PPTP and L2TP.
A. VPN requirements
To choose the most suitable VPN solution, it is necessary to
consider the following criteria [4]: Security, Implementation,
Management, Support, High Availability, Scalability, Flexibil-
ity and Cost.
1) Security: First of all, it is necessary to determine what
data needs to be protected. If it is necessary to protect traffic
for specific applications, such as e-mail, web, file transfer, and
others, the best solution can be a SSL VPN. If it is necessary
to protect all traffic for specific hosts or network segments,
it is probably better to use another type of VPN like IPSec.
Second, it is necessary to consider what kind of protection
is required: encryption, packet integrity, authentication. And
third, how much protection is needed? This means that it is
necessary to choose a sufficiently strong encryption algorithm
(e.g. 3DES, AES) and a reliable authentication method (pre-
shared keys, digital certificates) for the desired security level.
2) Implementation, Management and Support: Different
VPN solutions have different demands on implementation,
management, and support. For example, SSL VPNs are easier
to set up, manage, and troubleshoot compared to IPSec. Re-
garding key management, certificates from a PKI are usually
easier to manage and distribute than pre-shared keys.
3) High Availability: Some VPN implementations support
redundancy and some others don’t. It is also necessary to
determine the type of redundancy that is needed - chassis
or connection redundancy - and how well different VPN im-
plementations can deal with the specific redundancy method.
Moreover, some networking vendors implement other propri-
etary redundancy features.
4) Scalability and Flexibility: When choosing a VPN im-
plementation, it is convenient to ensure that the chosen solu-
tion is scalable and flexible. The solution needs to be scalable
to accommodate the future growth of the network, and flexible
to deal with changes that occur within the network. In other
words, if it is needed to add more sites to the VPN design, it is
necessary to consider how much work it is required to perform
this change, how many devices are needed to configure or
reconfigure, how much configuration has to be performed on
these devices, whether additional overhead can affect existing
devices, etc.
5) Cost: Some costs that need to be evaluated are:
• Hardware devices.
• Software products and licenses.
• Network vendor maintenance and support costs.
• Personnel costs and personnel training costs.
• Bandwidth for the VPN traffic and associated overhead.
B. Future directions
Because INDECT systems will exchange sensitive data in
many ways, it will be necessary to choose the most convenient
VPN solutions for each individual case. The most suitable
solution for the remote access of Users to a private network
and for the web-based data transmission seems to be the SSL
VPN technology. On the other hand, to secure the entire com-
munication among remote private networks over an insecure
network, it would be better to use the IPSec VPN technology.
It will be also desirable to consider the different security
levels of chosen VPN solutions regarding used cryptographic
algorithms, authentication and key distribution methods.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS
One of the main research areas addressed by INDECT is
cryptographic algorithms development. This section reviews
security basics of cryptographic algorithms, symmetric and
asymmetric ciphers as well as key management issues, in order
to properly define the requirements for the new cryptographic
algorithms to be developed.
A. The basics of cryptographic algorithms
Cryptographic algorithms are mainly applicable for provid-
ing data confidentiality and integrity, as well as identification
and authentication processes [5]. The cryptographic algorithm
(cipher) is a mathematical function which transforms data to
an unreadable form to anyone except the key owners. Keys
are binary strings which are used for plain-text encryption and
ciphered text decryption. In general, we can specify two types
of cryptographic algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric.
B. Symmetric ciphers
In symmetric algorithms the encryption key can be cal-
culated from the decryption key and vice versa. In most
cases the encryption and decryption keys are exactly the
same. Symmetric algorithms, which are also called secret
key algorithms, require that both the sender and the recipient
have exchanged in advance their respective keys, and they
are responsible to keep them in secret. The security of the
symmetric algorithms is based on the key. If the secret key is
found, everyone is able to encrypt and decrypt any message.
1) DES and Triple DES (3DES): The Data Encryption
Standard (DES) was a well known block cipher operating on
64-bit data blocks. The encryption transformation depends on
a 56-bit secret key and consists of sixteen Feistel iterations
surrounded by two permutations.
Since a 56-bit secret key is considered insecure, Triple
DES was later proposed. The idea behind Triple-DES is to
increase the number of DES encryptions three times with two
or three different keys. This method gains strength both against
cryptanalytic attacks as well as against exhaustive search.
However, it is weak against related key attack, and the speed
is three times slower than single-DES.
2) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): AES, originally
published as Rijndael, is a block cipher with a variable block
size and variable key size. The key size and the block size
can be independently specified to 128, 192 or 256 bits. In the
simplest scenario we have 128-bit key size and the same block
size. In this case, a 128-bit message (plain text, cipher text)
block is segmented into 16 bytes. AES algorithm was designed
to have the following characteristics: resistance against all
known attacks, speed and code compactness on a wide range
of platforms, as well as design simplicity.
C. Asymmetric ciphers
In asymmetric algorithms, which are also called public key
algorithms, the encryption and decryption are performed with
two different keys: a private key and a public key. In addition
to this, the decrypting key cannot be calculated from the
encryption key. The encryption key is called public and it is
not necessary to be kept in secret. Everyone can use it for
encryption, but only the one who has the respective decryption
key can decrypt the message. The decryption key is thus
called personal or private. By means of asymmetric ciphers
we can encrypt messages, as well as to authenticate a user
in possession of the private key. The most popular public-key
cryptosystem is RSA, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman.
D. Key management
The security of one symmetric cryptographic system is a
function of strength of the algorithm and length of the key.
In real life the key management of a cryptographic system
is one of the most important aspects of its security [6]. The
introduction of a secure management of keys is crucial, and
quite often the attacks to cryptographic systems are directed
to the weaknesses of key management. In computer systems
the key management is normally done by means of a Key
Management Center. Key management implies: generation,
distribution, use, storage, time (period) of use, change and
destruction of keys.
Taking into account the complexity and the broad scope of
the INDECT project, as well as the big number and variety
of end-users devices, we consider that the most favourable
approach for creation of cryptographic Key Distribution and
Management Center is a combined method, thus the center
should support both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.
Additional functionality could be digital certification. It is
worth to mention that some devices, i.e. video cameras,
support this technique.
A brute-force attack (check of all possible keys) is the last
available technique for breaking the cryptographic system.
Two parameters define the time of a successful brute-force
attack: number of keys to check and speed (time) of each
check. The selection of the key length for the specific appli-
cation depends on the time we want the data to be protected
and on the value of those data.
E. Future directions
INDECT will develop some new cryptographic algorithms
based on S-Boxes to ensure the security of INDECT system.
Below we present crucial requirements and features of the new
solutions.
• The cipher algorithms employed to ensure data confiden-
tiality must be strong and must not have any backdoors
allowing decrypting data without the key. The minimal
key size should be 128 bits for symmetric algorithm and
2048 bits for asymmetric algorithm.
• Cryptographic algorithms should support a shared key
service to ensure multi-user encryption.
• The security of a cipher must be based on the strength of
the algorithm (must not be based on the secrecy of the
algorithm).
• Keys should be generated by means of random number
generators. These keys should be statistically tested to
ensure truly randomness.
IV. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
Quantum Cryptography (QC) is other topic of INDECT
research on security. QC is a powerful security technique
which provides unbreakable communication via optical or
wireless links. Usually, it is based on phase-encoding of the
photons that are transmitted over a dedicated optical fibers,
called “dark fibers”. QC ensures the highest security level,
because it is not possible to eavesdrop the communication in
a passive way. If an eavesdropper reads transmitted data, it
will change the quantum states of the photons and he will be
discovered [7].
The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols could be
based on phase-encoding of the photons (single particles) or
based on quantum entangled pairs of photons. An entangled
photon pair is a couple of photons with a unique correla-
tion, such that the property of one photon is automatically
and instantly determined at the moment the other photon’s
property is measured. Nowadays, a lot of QKD algorithms
(i.e. BB84, E91, B92,SARG04) have been proposed in the
literature. Moreover many different QC devices (e.g. produced
by idQuantique, SmartQuantum, MagiQ) have been already
constructed. Because QC is moving outside the research labo-
ratories, it is now possible to apply this technique in practice.
The crucial issue is the integration of QC with existing
networks, because building additional optical infrastructure in
metropolitan areas is very expensive.
It is still not clear if QKD will cause a revolution in com-
munications. Although there are still a lot of problems with
deploying the QKD in real optical or wireless communication
networks, we can exchange information secured by means
of QC in specific environments. One of the crucial issues
concerns requirements. QC in optical networks will be possible
if we solve a few practical problems and meet some specific
requirements. They could be divided into two groups: end-user
requirements and system requirements [8].
A. End-user requirements
At the beginning of the system design process, end-users
should define their specific requirements. This requirements
should come from all stakeholders and express the desired
properties of the whole communication system. When we
consider the QKD technique, the early adopters of systems that
will be protected by means of QC are: banks, big corporations
or public administration.
1) Security: Very often data security is a crucial issue.
Let’s consider a communication system of the Police. A weak
security system jeopardizes the Police to carry out cover
investigations, but is could even put in risk the life of many
people. QC ensures the highest level of system security.
2) Cost: The cost is usually the most frequently end-user
requirement that appears during the design process. Unfortu-
nately, QC is a very expensive technique. Therefore, only when
end-user requirements do not include severe cost restrictions,
we can seriously think about deploying QC.
3) Performance: Performance is a feature of the system
that is inseparable from security, because it is usually inversely
proportional to the security level of the system. QC in com-
parison with asymmetric ciphers provides much more efficient
data encryption, because enables secure secret key exchange
prior to data transmission.
4) Ease of use: End-users of communication systems usu-
ally are not engineers and do not possess advanced technical
skills. Fortunately QKD devices deployed in communication
system do not generate additional difficulty in user interface.
The objective of this technique is to be completely ’transpar-
ent’ for end-users.
B. System requirements
The second group of requirements - System Requirements
- express desirable properties of the system itself. They are
important because, on the one hand, system requirements
should lead to the achievement of user requirements and, on
the other hand, should indicate how to archive the optimal
solution from the available technology point of view.
1) Confidentiality: The best way to ensure confidentiality is
data encryption. Currently, network communications are often
protected using a symmetric encryption algorithm, like AES
or 3DES. When data confidentiality is the crucial requirement,
QC in conjunction with strong symmetric cipher (e.g. AES
with a key size of 256 bits) is really a good solution.
2) Communication security: Communication security en-
sures that information flows only between the proper end
points. QC ensures this requirement by means of the principles
of quantum mechanics.
3) Privacy: Privacy assurance is the protection of user data
against disclosure. When eavesdroppers want to observe the
quantum information, they change the quantum states and can
be discovered.
4) Scalability: This feature of the system does not require
to change the whole security system but only an extension
of the system when a bank or other big corporation has to
connect a new branch. QC is thus a scalable technique.
C. Future directions
Currently we are developing a high-level QC security pro-
tocol to ensure the highest level of data security. Below we
present security requirements for quantum cryptography. We
should meet these requirements to be sure that the imple-
mented quantum cryptography protocol is secure enough for
the target purpose.
• Quantum information should be coded by means of single
photons to avoid split light and receive information in
secret way, and should be transmitted using dedicated
fibers (’dark fibers’).
• High-level QC protocols must compare enough bits to be
sure that nobody has eavesdropped the communication.
• Cipher algorithms that are used in quantum cryptography
must ensure high level of confidentiality and must use
long and randomly generated keys to encrypt data.
V. FEDERATED ID MANAGEMENT
A Federated Identity Management system is being devel-
oped in the INDECT project. It is tailored to support the
coordination of different departments and security forces,
with the provision of a simple authentication mechanism
that controls the access to the corresponding inter-connected
systems. Along with content heterogeneity, due to the mul-
tiple data sources of sensitive information from the different
project subsystems, comes the need to support multiple access
levels depending on the user roles/attributes. The federated
management system will operate across existing technical
boundaries including heterogeneous operating systems and
security platforms [14].
A. Identity Management in INDECT project
Layered web authentication and access control services
should be implemented in the two main interfaces with the
end-users (e.g Police Officers). Policemen will use their PCs
and interact with the integrated INDECT Portal website while
working in the office, and during field duty they will use their
mobile equipment, that is, PDAs/Smartphones. Federated ID
will provide them with a highly ergonomic (contextual, col-
laborative and personalized) single point of access to multiple
data sources. However, given the heterogeneity of the informa-
tion being handled, there will also be an Advanced Interactive
Video Streaming System (IVAS) as an alternative channel to
support communication and processing of multimedia streams.
The underlying interoperable web-based SOA architecture will
be prepared for two different profile categories in the access
management: either for passive clients (web browsers), using
an HTTPS connection, or active clients (smart/rich apps),
with SOAP/XML messaging. Access decisions will be based
on the roles that individual users have as part of the Police
organization.
B. Authentication and Authorisation methods
Within a single organisation, Single Sign On (SSO) could
be a suitable way to authenticate the users in a variety of
disparate systems in order to give them access to multiple
resources using a single set of credentials. The user would log
into a client or terminal using the corresponding SSO-based
username and password, and then the system would validate
its authenticity and log the user into the underlying systems in
a transparent way (username and password stored in a secure
directory).
However, for a multi-organisation network, a complete
Federated ID management system should be the security
solution to guarantee that the system being accessed is the
intended one and that the user attempting to log in is who
she claims to be. The procedure is based on both need-to-
know and the role of the individual or group in the process
requiring access. In this case, the access would no longer be
based on relatively static organisational structures but would
be built from dynamic, process-based operational/functional
requirements, which in this case are tailored to the INDECT
context of use, enabling the horizontal fusion of the distributed
services provided through the different INDECT subsystems.
C. Federated ID Specifications
Federated Identity management is the process required to
establish secure and cost-effective business collaboration with
an auditable trail of who is connecting to the target application
and resources [13]. It would allow individuals to use the
same personal identification to have access to a ’circle of
trust/confidence’, thus being able to share information be-
tween domains that have their own directories, security or
authentication technologies. Efficiency in submission of access
control details lowers the risk of security threats and identity
management costs, while also ensuring the interoperability
between business partners.
Federated infrastructures allow having a unique identity,
hosted in an Identity Provider (IdP) or account partner, that
is accepted by one or more Service Providers (SP) or re-
lying parties. The latter allows a user to access a resource
or an application; and the former is responsible for user
authentication. The system formed by one or more IdPs
and SPs is called a ’federation’, and it is characterized by
having a relationship of trust among its members, simplifying
data communication and validation of users in a secure way.
Trust management addresses relationships (system-to-system,
business-to-business) between entities within organizations,
security domains and systems, dealing with business and
technological aspects altogether.
Identity details and authentication complexity could be
hidden behind the protocols and APIs elaborated in different
specifications. Some well known Federated Identity standards
that have been developed for enterprise-centric models are
Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML), Liberty ID-
FF and Web services (WS) Federation:
• OASIS SAML TC [12]: Specs based in XML that
allow cross-domain authentication. Two main compo-
nents define SAML assertions, describing security tokens
representing users, and SAML bindings and profiles.
SAML protocol has three versions: SAML 1.0, 1.1, (1.x
for single sign-on functionality) and 2.0, which takes
input from Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF) 1.2 but with a major functional increase (a deeper
consideration of the identity life cycle functionality and
privacy concerns).
• Liberty Alliance Project [9]–[11]: Federated single sign-
on protocols developed by a group of vendors (i.e. IBM)
as part of the Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF). There have been Liberty ID-FF 1.1 and 1.2 releases,
the latter being superseded by SAML 2.0.
• WS-Federation [15]: Extensions to the WS-Trust Se-
curity Token Service to enable standard based security
approaches for both browser-based and Web services-
based applications in service-oriented architecture (SOA)
environments. It provides to federation partners: identity
brokering, attribute request and retrieval, and authenti-
cation and authorization claims with privacy protection.
There have been two releases of WS-Federation: 1.0 and
1.1.
In spite of the limitations associated with Federated ID,
mainly referred to its complexity and constrains for deploy-
ment (due to the lack of support by governmental organizations
and the non-existence of an underlying legislation), this access
control solution is proposed as the most suitable one in order
to centralize the authentication of INDECT subsystems.
D. Future directions
Technical solutions for Federated ID in European ID au-
thentication and Identity Management require the analysis
of the limitations of current federated identity approaches
and technologies in order to cover the European citizens
requirements and expectations for non-anonymous services.
Most of them refer to the incorporation of more partners and to
the exploitation of more technical choices for monitoring and
surveillance in virtual or real environments targeted to protect
the citizens. Intended users at later stages of the INDECT
project will be all the services and institutions responsible
for crime protection and the maintenance of public security
(departments of public prosecutions and justice and also
counter-terrorism). Furthermore, new standards-based Web
services with increased capability (improved interface, greater
flexibility and reliability) may be made available to this wider
circle of trust, considering their requirements for security and
privacy. In this framework for added-value services and seam-
less access to a number of departments, any kind of identity
management duplication should be avoided. Sharing identities
across the borders will require, at least, the use of common
standard specifications and unified definition of profiles (i.e.
categories for user rights or procedures for account linking
and alias management). New technologies, knowledge and
methodologies will also need to be developed in an interop-
erable framework (i.e. more sophisticated human recognition
systems, separately watermarked components, etc).
To sum up, the future projection of Federated ID will require
the management of an increasing number of functionalities
provided by means of web services. Process reuse adapted
to the business logic in autonomous distributed services will
be the basis in the standards. The awareness of the technical
security vulnerabilities due to seamless integration will lead
the project to consider an Identity Management framework
supporting the effective control of user identities, establishing
trust, enabling privacy, and complying with legal and regula-
tory environments.
VI. MOBILE SECURITY
Wireless Ad-hoc networks are data networks that do not
rely on fixed infrastructure, but they are built automatically
among the devices in a certain area. Therefore they are a very
appealing tool for security forces, especially to manage emer-
gencies when traditional communication networks do not work
or are collapsed. However ad-hoc networking poses a number
of challenges in order to provide truly auto-configuration,
user mobility, robustness, performance, energy efficiency and
Fig. 1. Multi-organization Ad-hoc network for emergency response.
confidentiality. In particular, confidentiality is a must for an
ad-hoc network for security forces. Although there are plenty
of security mechanisms for computer networks, security in
ad-hoc networks is still an open issue because of the lack of
access to a trustable third party.
A. Ad-hoc Security
In order to enhance the security of an ad-hoc network,
several layers of the TCP/IP stack should be considered.
Application layer should deal with end-to-end security issues,
whereas ad-hoc routing and lower layers lack of most of the
security mechanisms developed for standard TCP/IP stacks.
In particular, the application layer (or a session layer tightly
coupled with it) should provide security at Users level. For
instance provide Authentication of the other communicating
peer, Confidentiality, Integrity, and non-Repudiation depend-
ing on the application. From a communication stand-point
most of these problems can be solved with well know tech-
niques such as TLS/SSL and User certificates. However, it
is necessary to consider the especial characteristics of this
scenario, namely the lack of fixed infrastructure and the
need to locate nearby users from different, not fully trusted
organizations.
Probably, designing a secure ad-hoc routing is the most
challenging aspect, since ad-hoc routing is still in its in-
fancy, moving from the research labs to initial large-scale
deployments. For instance, there is not a single standard ad-
hoc routing protocol but many, tailored to specific scenarios.
Reactive protocols, like AODV [18] or DSR [19], are best
suited for mobile nodes, whereas Pro-active ones, like OLSR
[17], have been mostly deployed in mesh networks with little
mobility. Probably the most useful scenario for security and
emergency forces is the so called Mobile Ad hoc Network
or MANET, where most nodes are mobile and relationships
among nodes do not last long. For this reason we will focus
on the security of reactive protocols, especially AODV and
DSR, since they are the most popular routing protocols for
MANETs.
Although there are some works in the literature about
security in ad-hoc networks, there is still little experience with
real wireless ad-hoc networks and far less applied security
research when compared to their fixed counterparts. Most
works [16] are more focused on identifying a particular attack
for a given protocol and its specific countermeasure, than
providing a global security solution. This is a brief list of the
identified attacks (some of them are generic, whereas others
only affect a particular routing protocol):
• Black/Gray hole attack. Attract all traffic towards an
attacker node by means of routing, and then drop it all
or just a fraction of it in order to avoid detection.
• Sleep deprivation attack. Redirect traffic continuously
towards a victim in order to deplete its battery.
• Rushing attack. Destination nodes usually reply only to
the first RREQ message. Thus attackers send their own
RREQ message before others to impose a given route.
• Modify Hop/Sequence number (AODV only). Attacker
could promote himself by advertising a route with less
hops or a greater sequence number.
• Modify Source Route (DSR only). DSR specifies the
full path in the RREP messages. Thus an attacker could
modify the RREP route at its will.
• Broadcast false routes (DSR only). In order to save
bandwidth DSR nodes have a cache that is populated by
overhearing RREP messages. An attacker could poison
DSR route caches by generating false RREP messages.
• Falsify Route Errors. An attacker could generate a DoS
attack by tearing down valid routes.
• Selfish/Malicious MAC layer. An attacker may configure
its wireless interface with lower back-off values in order
to gain some performance advantage.
• Jamming. An attacker may generate a strong signal that
interferes with the wireless channel being employed.
There are a number of solutions for some of the above
attacks, although most works usually focus just in one of them:
• Encrypt and Sign all messages. To avoid eavesdropping
and message modification in transit. However this solu-
tion requires some trusted key distribution mechanism.
• Access Control. Exclude attackers from routing by au-
thenticating new nodes before joining to the MANET.
• Reputation mechanisms. When no authorization is possi-
ble, some authors propose to build a reputation mech-
anism in order to classify nodes into cooperative or
uncooperative classes.
• Levels of security/trust. In order to limit insider attacks,
the routing protocol prefers nodes from the same security
level (e.g. Police officers) than just choosing the shortest
path.
• Randomize Message Forwarding. To avoid rushing attack,
some authors propose to queue and send RREQ messages
at random times. However this may add extra latency to
path discovery.
• Do not use hop count. Since hop count field can be forged
by intermediate nodes, ignore it and just reply to the first
RREQ.
• Hash chains. An alternative to secure the hop count is to
generate a hash chain so a shorter path cannot be claimed.
• Onion routing. Encrypt the DSR source route between
hops to avoid tampering.
• Overhearing / Probing / Feedback. To detect packet
dropping by means of a black/grey hole attack.
B. Future directions
After analyzing the literature about security on ad-hoc
networks, we consider that low-level attacks, such as jamming
and non-cooperative CSMA/CD medium access, are the most
important threats in ad-hoc networks because it is quite
difficult, if not impossible, to defend the network from these
kinds of attacks (i.e. requires specialised hardware). Therefore
it is better to assume that an adversary is able to disrupt
any wireless link within a certain range, and design a routing
protocol that is able to detect this damaged zone and quickly
route around it. In particular we are investigating how a
routing protocol with multi-path capabilities, which is able to
discover/employ different paths in parallel, can be employed
in this case to limit the impact of a lower-layer attack and to
quickly recover from it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Nowadays security is one of the most important features of
a communications system. This is specially true for Police
information systems such as the ones being developed by
the INDECT project. This paper has reviewed a few stan-
dard and under-study security mechanisms to be deployed to
support the security of INDECT systems. In particular a full
categorization of Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies
has been presented, as well as key aspects of the research
on novel Cryptographic Algorithms based on S-Boxes, and
a new Quantum Cryptography (QC) protocol for top-security
systems. The creation of a Key Management Center and the
usage of Federated ID technology are key aspects in order to
glue together all the heterogeneous information sources and
INDECT systems in a secure way. Finally, a review of the
state of the art in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks and the rationale
behind a new multi-path ad-hoc routing protocol to withstand
low level attacks (e.g. jamming) are also presented.
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